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MUST A MEDIATOR BE NEUTRAL? 
YOU’D BETTER BELIEVE IT!* 
JOSEPH B. STULBERG** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Have solution; what’s your problem? 
If that were the business card of a professional mediator, do not hire 
her.  If that were the card of a skillful consultant, secure her services. 
Why does that answer seem straightforward, but yet mediators 
remain divided about whether a mediator must be neutral with regard to 
the outcomes that parties embrace? 
I am perplexed.  In my judgment, if we want to use mediation to help 
persons resolve conflicts because we believe, centrally, that participating 
in mediation is, and should be, a justice event, then mediator neutrality 
is required. 
In this Article, I want to advance and defend two claims: a mediator 
must be neutral because justice demands it; and, empirically, a mediator 
can, in fact, be neutral in the required way.  Each claim has been 
disparaged by practitioners and scholars.  If the critics are correct, then 
there is no principled basis for distinguishing the mediator’s1 
 
* This title, of course, deliberately plays off the remarkably important article by 
Professor Ronald Dworkin entitled Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 87 (1996).  While I—and most other mortals—can only aspire to match his 
standard of excellence in terms of intellectual insight governing a particular topic, I hope that 
by borrowing his title, I can display a comparable passion both for the topic under review and 
one’s belief about how important it is to get our thinking right about it. 
** John W. Bricker Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law.  
I wish to thank Professors Andrea K. Schneider, Peter Salem, and Susan Yates for inviting 
me to participate in their important symposium and to join Professor Lawrence Susskind in 
revisiting our Vermont Law Review exchange.  In addition, I would like to thank Theodore 
Greeley, Editor in Chief, and the editorial staff of the Marquette Law Review for their 
support in bringing this Article to fruition.  Finally, I wish to acknowledge publicly my deep 
admiration and respect for my long-time friend and professional colleague, Professor 
Susskind; his contributions to our field are stimulating, rich, and sustained, and it is always a 
pleasure to be in his company.  
1. Professor Susskind has stated that he and others such as Professor Howard Raiffa do 
not refer to the mediator as a “neutral intervener,” but as the “n+1,” where “n” stands for the 
number of participating stakeholders and “n+1” is the intervener.  Lawrence Susskind, 
Professor, MIT, Remarks at the 30th Anniversary Conference: The Mediator and Public 
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participation from that of a bully or a philosopher king.  And if that is 
so, then thoughtful citizens should widely criticize government agencies, 
courts, and other institutions that promote or mandate mediation’s use.  
But, I will argue, if the mediator is neutral, then the mediation process 
itself constitutes both an important justice event as well as a crucial 
methodology in a rule-of-law regime for non-violently securing or 
advancing individual dignity and freedom. 
I believe, then, that much is at stake in the debate about mediator 
neutrality.  I recognize this is a complex subject.  It invites spirited 
debate and deserves careful, thorough analysis.  I may not do it justice, 
but I want to try.  The danger of such discussions is that comments are 
often crafted at an abstract level divorced from practical applications.  I 
want to try to avoid that pitfall by proceeding first with an examination 
of the contexts and challenges in which the question of mediator 
neutrality arises and then examine why the question about mediator 
neutrality is of interest. 
II.  MEDIATION AS A JUSTICE EVENT 
I think of mediation as a process for displaying and promoting 
justice.  Certainly in the public domain, we design and advocate its use 
as a legitimate way of promoting the resolution of controversies among 
citizens in a political community. 
Consider the following civic controversy: church members object to 
the activity of a striptease club located next door.  Its members engage 
in various protest activities, from lying down in the parking lot to taking 
pictures of patrons and posting them to a website.  The business owner 
and some of the business’s patrons respond by standing in the club 
parking lot on Sunday mornings before announced worship services 
carrying large picket signs depicting men and women fornicating; these 
signs, of course, are easily visible to all parishioners, including children, 
as they enter their church.  The parties agree to resolve their matters 
through mediation.  I believe that they are both looking for—and are 
entitled to—a process that is fair in form and outcome.  They are not 
 
Policy, Vermont Law School (Oct. 12, 2011), available at 
http://www.vermontlaw.edu/academics/dispute_resolution_program.htm; see also HOWARD 
RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 23 (1982) (defining a mediator as “an 
impartial outsider who tries to aid the negotiators in their quest to find a compromise 
agreement”). 
10 - STULBERG-10.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/8/2012  8:31 PM 
2012] MUST A MEDIATOR BE NEUTRAL? 831 
looking simply for a procedure that “will end their problems.”2 
This vision of mediation differs from two important, albeit related, 
ideas.  The first idea views mediation as an efficient tool for facilitating 
agreement and gaining compliance among disputing persons about 
future-looking plans.  The second idea emphasizes that many people use 
mediating skills and strategies to resolve conflicts, but do not pretend or 
represent themselves to be a mediator.  I want to consider each briefly. 
Presume a tenured faculty member is serving as department chair of 
the psychology department at a small liberal arts college.  Two faculty 
department members are viciously antagonistic toward one another.  
Neither respects the other’s research skills or publications; each publicly 
criticizes the other’s teaching skills to other departmental colleagues and 
students.  They refuse to serve together on the same department 
committees.  And they each want to teach a very popular course entitled 
“The Psychology of Aging,” for which one section per year is offered.  
Can that department chair effectively mediate the controversy over 
their teaching assignment? 
There are a number of adverse dynamics operating in this situation.  
Suppose the department chair brings the disputing faculty members into 
her office and says this: “I have had it with the two of you.  Your 
conduct demoralizes both faculty colleagues and students.  Your 
criticisms of one another’s scholarship, while possible in principle, is 
done in a remarkably unprofessional manner.  Here is how we will 
handle the teaching assignment: we will rotate.  Ms. Alice, you taught it 
last year so I will assign it to Ms. Susan for this coming year.  Ms. Alice, 
you will get it the following year.  I can’t see any other way to resolve 
this, can you?” 
Then Ms. Alice explodes: “That’s crazy.  I wrote my Ph.D. 
dissertation in this area only four years ago; I am the expert on this 
 
2. For if that were all either sought, they could consider hiring an arsonist to engage in 
conduct that would eliminate the other side.  To the challenge that such conduct is illegal, of 
course that is true.  But if one had sufficient power, and was thoughtfully savvy and thought 
that one could engage in that conduct without getting caught, then, at least in principle, one 
or both of the parties could consider it.  By contrast, those interested in resolving the conflict 
“fairly” rule out certain approaches from the start.  To be less dramatic, of course, all one 
needs to consider is that one of the parties seeks legal redress for their challenge but in a 
jurisdiction in which the judges are routinely “bought” by various parties, or where 
government officials require payments in order to advance the procedure—that is, processes 
in which justice is obviously undermined or distorted.  We do not tolerate such distortions 
when using mediation, either; using mediation to resolve disputes in a political community is a 
justice event. 
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subject.  I should teach it both to advance my own research and to serve 
the students well.”  Ms. Susan responds, “You know that my long-time 
career research has focused on the psychology of adolescent behavior.  
But after twenty-five years in teaching, I clearly wanted to branch out 
and look for new things.  So I have been examining issues in this area for 
the past two years.  I love it.  I bring the depth of my career’s 
perspective to it.  And it is where I plan to do my future scholarship.”  
The two face each other; silence prevails.  Finally, Ms. Alice states, “If 
you won’t let us offer more than one section once per year, then I guess 
alternating is the best option.”  And Ms. Susan responds, “Guess that’s 
right.”  At which point the department chair says, “Terrific.  We have an 
agreement.  Now get out.”  The department chair, later that evening, 
reports to her dean that she has finally—and successfully—mediated the 
controversy regarding teaching assignments between Ms. Alice and Ms. 
Susan. 
The second scenario involves a parent trying to assist his two young 
children to resolve their dispute regarding which video game to play on 
their Nintendo Wii.  The father says, “John, David.  Stop shouting.  
Let’s try to work this out.  First, I want John to talk and make his 
proposals; David, let him finish before you talk.  Then, David, you will 
speak and share your ideas and John will not interrupt.  After that, we’ll 
see how we go forward.”  After three minutes of conversation, the 
children reach an agreement on which game they will each play, the 
sequence of who gets the machine first, and the length of time each can 
play before turning it over to the other sibling.  When the father’s 
spouse comes home later that evening, he reports to her that “the 
evening was a bit wild, but I successfully mediated the dispute between 
the kids about the use of the Wii machine.” 
Would we agree that the department chair and the parent engaged 
in “mediating”?  And, if so, would we describe either process as a justice 
event?  More important, if we did not, do we care? 
While neither situation is an example of the mediation process, at 
least in the core central meaning of that phrase, I do not believe that 
there is any significant harm in describing the department chair’s 
conduct as a limited version of mediating and saying that the parent 
used mediating skills in forging agreements reached by his children. 
Further, I do not believe that in either situation our dominant concern is 
that the process used to resolve the dispute comports with notions of 
justice.  The department chair wants the controversy quieted—on 
efficiency grounds, if nothing else.  The chorus of okays regarding the 
teaching schedule, whether imposed or embraced, really is not 
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important; the chair wants to put the matter behind them and move on; 
she made it clear the direction the resolution would take, and, in 
management jargon, obtained some (tepid) buy-in.  While this process 
of problem solving and decision-making might be incorporated and 
embraced by various business organizations as one tool for handling 
disputes collaboratively and efficiently, no mediator would celebrate 
these approaches as being ones consistent with justice considerations. 
The same is true for the parent intervention.  There are other, more 
pressing values to consider: a quiet evening; children behaving; and, 
possibly, everyone getting to sleep at a reasonable hour.  We could all 
understand that this situation may simply not be the time to be 
concerned about whether this is a fair process and outcome. 
All of which is to say that justice is one virtue, but perhaps not the 
most important one, for various aspects of our lives.3   
But neither of these intervener approaches is sufficient to address 
the dynamics of the civic controversy sketched above.  We do not want a 
city mayor, in the style of the department chair, to admonish parties to 
behave civilly, nor do we want law enforcement officers, à la the parent, 
to monitor participant conduct.  Rather, we want an intervener who is 
respected by the participants to engage the stakeholders, shape a rich 
dialogue among them and prod them to explore and take responsibility 
for developing acceptable ways to create a stable, functioning 
relationship.  In short, we want a mediator to guide the conversation in a 
manner that insures that values and principles other than the “get this 
case off my desk” mentality take center stage. 
III.  WHAT IS THE COST OF THE INTERVENER NOT BEING NEUTRAL? 
What does a party to a mediation conference want in her mediator?  
While I recognize that there are a number of qualities and 
 
3. In neither the department-chair nor the parent example, of course, are we indifferent 
to the manner in which the matter is resolved.  We want there to be a modicum of peace 
within the department; we want children to be respected and to feel as though the matter was 
resolved in a non-arbitrary way.  But efficiency and other priorities carry more weight than 
due process concerns.  (Frankly, I overstate the matter in the parent example just for 
purposes of emphasis; I actually believe that one of the most important lessons that parents 
can teach and model for their children are those values of according respect and dignity to 
one another in the conduct of challenging conversations—those disputing moments among 
siblings become occasions for teaching others about fair dealing.  But I recognize that not 
every parenting moment can command that approach.) 
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characteristics she seeks in the intervener,4 I would argue that being 
neutral is central.  If one were skeptical, of course, one might assert that 
each disputant wants an intervener who will endorse her perspective and 
proposals, and then persuade the other party to agree to embrace them.  
But since each individual recognizes that everyone might want that, and 
that no one will agree to such an intervener because it undercuts her 
interests to do so, then, minimally, each party seeks someone who will 
not instantly be against her interests or try to persuade her to relinquish 
her proposals on some or all matters.  That is, each will want the 
mediator to be neutral—not someone who is simply impartial or 
objective. 
We can test this claim by considering the following standard legal 
dispute: a landlord brings an eviction action against her tenant for 
nonpayment of rent.  The tenant has refused to pay rent for the past two 
months.  Her defense is that her landlord used white paint when 
painting her apartment walls rather than the dark blue that the tenant 
had requested and that, the tenant claims, had been agreed to by the 
landlord when the parties signed the lease.  In most U.S. jurisdictions, 
the tenant’s asserted ground does not constitute a legal basis for 
nonpayment; a judge would rule in the landlord’s favor. 
But what if that case were referred to mediation.  The standard 
mediation approach would be to invite the parties to share their 
perspectives; recount their understandings; explore possible options for 
advancing respective, if not competing, interests; and assist them in 
exploring possible settlement terms.  Some possible outcomes might 
include the landlord agreeing to let the tenant buy her desired paint 
color and paint the apartment interior as she wished in exchange for  the 
landlord having the right to repaint the apartment interior to her desired 
color—at the tenant’s expense—six months prior to the expiration of the 
lease.  And with that understanding and commitment, the landlord 
might agree to waive her claim for current rent arrears. 
All that might be possible.  But, what would we say if the mediator 
 
4. Famously, Riskin’s original grid is designed as a guide to the possibly perplexed 
advocate who is seeking assistance in thinking through what skills and traits to look for in 
selecting a mediator.  The suggestions range from intellectual acuity and substantive 
knowledge about the topic in dispute to possession of process skills.  See Leonard L. Riskin, 
Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 
1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996); see also JOSEPH B. STULBERG & LELA P. LOVE, THE 
MIDDLE VOICE: MEDIATING CONFLICT SUCCESSFULLY 28–30 (2009) (articulating sixteen 
characteristics that a person would want a mediator to possess). 
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did not explore those possibilities and instead said to the parties, 
whether in joint session or caucus, “Look.  Everyone knows the rules.  
Tenant, there is no legal basis for your refusing to pay rent.  Although 
the landlord can waive her rights, you must be prepared to pay her the 
money you owe her.  Let’s see if we can work out a payment system that 
works for you and is acceptable to the landlord.”  Why would we be 
concerned about the mediator acting this way? 
First, some would argue that while a mediator can provide legal 
information to the parties (if qualified by training and experience to do 
so),5 it is not the mediator’s role to do so.  Second, and more 
significantly, we might criticize the mediator for insisting that the tenant 
recognize that she “has no legal case” and that the tenant should “agree 
to perform her legal duty.”  Why is that problematic? 
I believe the only basis for claiming that such a mediator move is 
objectionable—and should be roundly criticized—is that it vividly 
displays that the mediator is not neutral with respect to what the 
outcome should be.  Quite the contrary, she believes that the tenant 
“should do what the law requires.” 
But here is the irony.  I believe that a mediator in that situation 
could comfortably and accurately describe her conduct as impartial.6  
Why?  Impartiality requires that the intervener apply the relevant rules 
and guidelines in an identical manner to all persons similarly situated.  
To the disgruntled tenant who complains that she believes that the 
mediator is “beating up” on her, the mediator could readily retort that 
“my comments are nothing against you personally—I would be saying 
this to any tenant so situated.”  And she—the mediator—would be 
absolutely correct. 
To critics who might be worried that the mediator is siding with the 
elite against the have-nots, all we need to do is alter the fact pattern so 
that the tenant refuses to pay rent because she is not receiving heat and 
hot water in her apartment.  Those grounds typically do constitute a 
basis for reducing rental payments, and the mediator could press the 
landlord to do what the law required by stating, “I am not doing this 
because I favor the tenant over you. I would say the same to any 
landlord if I were faced with these facts.” 
 
5. See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS standard VI.A.5 (2005). 
6. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 161 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that “there is no 
absurdity in conceding that an unjust law forbidding the access of coloured persons to the 
parks has been justly administered”). 
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So requiring a mediator to be impartial does not secure or advance a 
vision of mediation that inspires confidence that it is an alternative 
dispute resolution process to the courts.  Why?  Stated bluntly, the 
“rule(s)” that the mediator impartially applies may themselves be 
burdensome, unfair, discriminatory, or on some other basis, ill-founded.  
Applying them impartially, while better than arbitrarily, prima facie 
diminishes rather than advances substantive justice claims.  The 
mediator who is impartial may be, to borrow a phrase of a different 
generation, one more person who is part of the problem rather than the 
solution.7 
Is this concern for the difference between being neutral and being 
impartial relevant only for controversies involving presumptively 
modest financial claims?  Not at all.  Consider the following examples: 
(1) The family mediator insists that the soon-to-be ex-husband 
provide financial support at a level that meets the amounts set forth in 
that jurisdiction’s minimum child support guidelines.   
(2) The civil-court appointed mediator of a home construction 
controversy—a roof gone bad—prevents the plaintiff from seeking 
certain recovery for identifiable items because applicable evidentiary 
rules would preclude the introduction of supporting testimony at trial.   
(3) The mediator selected by the parties to resolve an alleged breach 
of a non-compete clause in an employment contract insists that 
whatever settlement terms the parties develop be consistent with the 
legal requirement that the “geographic range” governing such a non-
compete prohibition be reasonable. 
In each situation, the mediator acted impartially but not neutrally.  
In so doing, she undermines core values distinctive to the mediation 
process.  Why is mediator impartiality insufficient to insure a fair 
outcome? 
We want mediation to be a fair process that generates a fair 
outcome.  Deciding what is or is not fair, of course, is controversial.  
 
7. The Uniform Mediation Act (UMA), for instance, defines a mediator as “an 
individual who conducts a mediation,” but then insists that a mediator must disclose any 
information that may affect her impartiality.  See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 2(3) & cmt. 3 
(2003).  While I believe that the UMA is an important, positive contribution to the field in 
many aspects, I personally regret that it omits the term neutrality from its definition of the 
mediator’s role.  The same comment, regrettably, applies to the Model Standards of Conduct 
for Mediators.  See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS standard II 
(requiring that a mediator “conduct a mediation in an impartial manner” but not in a neutral 
manner). 
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One way to establish a fair outcome is to define its parameters or terms 
on grounds independent of the procedure used to secure them.  In 
deciding a fair outcome for dividing a cake among two children, for 
example, we decide that, absent a compelling reason, the presumptively 
fair division is to provide each child with equally sized slices.  The 
process we might use to secure that goal—“X cuts and Y chooses 
first”—is designed to promote that goal.  In Rawlsian terms, this 
approach to problem-solving would be described as an instance of 
“perfect procedural justice,”8 for in every iteration the process would 
produce the desired outcome.  If mediation were viewed as a process of 
perfect procedural justice—that is, one designed and used to help 
disputing parties secure an outcome that itself is defined and endorsed 
as desirable on grounds independent of mediation—then mediator 
impartiality, not neutrality, is sufficient.  In the examples above, if 
persons believe that the fair, mediated settlement terms are precisely 
those which the law mandates, then mediator impartiality is sufficient.  
But that is not a compelling vision of mediation; that is the picture of a 
settlement conference.   
Of course, we could relax the demanding standard of perfect 
procedural justice and posit mediation as an instance of “imperfect 
procedural justice.”9  In this latter situation, the desired outcome is still 
defined and embraced independently of the process—e.g., outcomes 
mandated by or consistent with the law—but we acknowledge that the 
mediation process might have other institutional values, such as party 
autonomy, that permit parties in some instances to reach outcomes that 
fail that standard.10  Rawls explicates this notion by citing our criminal 
 
8. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 85 (1971) (describing characteristic 
features of “perfect procedural justice”). 
9. See id. at 85–86 (illustrating the concept of “imperfect procedural justice”). 
10. Consider the following case: A nightclub patron sees a famous athlete in the club.  
The patron approaches the athlete and makes obnoxious, racially derogatory remarks to him.  
The athlete assaults the patron.  The patron, an immigrant who is in the United States 
illegally, brings a civil action against the athlete for damages.  In mediated settlement 
discussion, the patron’s lawyer indicates that if the defendant proposes to pay the plaintiff 
$50,000 in exchange for the patron’s promise not to pursue criminal charges, the proposal 
would itself be illegal as an instance of extortion.  The defendant, if convicted of a felony 
rather than a misdemeanor, would face certain jail time—and the resulting impairment of his 
employment status.  One possible resolution would be for the defendant to pay an agreed-
upon sum and for the plaintiff to agree to leave the country.  Without the victim, the 
prosecutor might file misdemeanor charges along the lines of disturbing the peace and require 
community service as a penalty.  The parties have reached an acceptable resolution, though 
arguably “all the requirements of law” have not been advanced.  I find this mediated outcome 
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trial process: if our goal is to convict the guilty and let the innocent go 
free, then we want to design and implement a criminal procedure 
process to secure this.11  But our criminal court procedures also have 
other values and goals—e.g., rules protecting the confidentiality of 
spousal statements—and the application of those rules might, in limited 
but predictable circumstances, undercut the promotion of the desired 
goal. 
I believe that this approach to mediation—where we insist only that 
a mediator be impartial when operating with rules that, independently 
of party agreement, identify the desired outcome—becomes even more 
toxic when used in settings where those “independent standards” are 
less visible or more narrowly embraced than something as public as “the 
law.”  The juvenile court mediator who insists that the fourteen-year-old 
agree to do homework “two hours per evening without interruption by 
text messages from friends” might be encouraging the teenager to 
engage in behavior that is, objectively, beneficial for her.  But the 
mediator, in dispensing her own brand of parental, maternalistic justice, 
is certainly “dissing” that teenager’s dignity.  In my judgment, that 
disrespect has no place in mediation. 
Finally, let us consider a mediator’s impartiality, not neutrality, in 
disputes involving matters that affect the environment, such as the 
location of a waste facility, the construction of a high-voltage 
transmission line, or the siting of windmills.  The impartial mediator 
would facilitate conversations to make certain that various EPA rules 
and guidelines were considered and adopted because they were the 
governing law.  This would insure consistency and predictability of 
negotiated outcomes but perhaps at the cost of party creativity, 
efficiency, and acceptability. 
I must make one important disclaimer.  When I insist that mediator 
impartiality is not sufficient to insure a just process or outcome, I do not 
mean to say that parties, in their spirited discussions or arguments about 
the controversy and in the development and advocacy of their proposals 
for resolving it, would not or should not make reference to those 
standards or claims.  Of course they would.  In fact, those elements 
might be decisive to a party’s decision to accept the proposed outcome.  
 
perfectly acceptable and creative.  But it suggests that there are other goals or values of the 
process that, on occasion, undermine the promotion of “generating outcomes mandated by 
law,” so in that way, mediation would be an example of imperfect procedural justice. 
11. See generally id. at 85–86. 
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And the mediator would be acting appropriately, I believe (consistent 
with a posture of neutrality), if she were to invite some or all of the 
parties to consider those matters—e.g., “Why do you believe, Mr. 
Stulberg, that the minimum support guidelines should not govern what 
you propose to pay your soon-to-be ex-spouse?”  These standards are 
certainly relevant to the parties’ discussion.  But mediation, I believe, 
does not require that they be decisive. 
If mediator impartiality is not sufficient to insure a just outcome, 
how about mediator objectivity?  Objectivity is clearly an important 
intellectual trait for a mediator: it is crucial for a mediator to be able to 
examine and analyze evidence without being influenced by irrelevant 
factors.  A mediator, for instance, who routinely evaluated the 
credibility of party accounts and proposals through the process of 
reactive devaluation12 would be not only ineffective, but also, and more 
importantly, she would be undermining mediation goals of improving 
party understanding or promoting constructive problem solving conduct. 
But mediator objectivity cannot be a sufficient condition for 
promoting conflict resolution.  Why?  A mediator could objectively 
analyze conditions relevant to influencing or persuading one party to 
agree to a certain course of action, and then act so as to secure such 
party compliance.  Requiring a mediator to be objective imposes even 
fewer constraints on her conduct than does the duty of impartiality. 
I conclude that neither impartiality nor objectivity require enough 
mediator discipline to give us confidence in the justice of the process 
and outcome. 
Where do we turn? 
IV.  MEDIATOR APPROACHES 
Let us return to a consideration of what a party values in their 
mediator.  There are two distinctions offered regarding mediator traits 
that I believe are profoundly wrong and generate undesirable social 
consequences.  The first is that between a “process expert” and a 
“substantive expert”—in other words, the belief that a mediator can be 
the first without being the second.13  The second distinction, described in 
 
12. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining Table, 87 
MARQ. L. REV. 795, 804–05 (2004). 
13. See James R. Antes et al., Is a Stage Model of Mediation Necessary?, 16 MEDIATION 
Q. 287, 288–91 (1999) (describing the mediator as “tour guide, helping the parties get where 
they want to go”).  But see id. at 289–90 (acknowledging that a mediator’s process decisions 
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different ways, is that between a “passive” and an “active” mediator.14  I 
believe these accounts are not accurate and undermine our 
understanding and endorsement of mediation as a justice process. 
A.  Process–Substance Dichotomy 
Mediation as we routinely use it today is clearly a dispute resolution 
process.  And there are clearly practices and guidelines that shape its 
procedural dimensions: the questions of who can or cannot participate, 
what topics can or must be addressed, and what information is public or 
private are illustrative. 
A mediator must be a “process expert”: she must not only know how 
to implement the operative guidelines of mediating within a particular 
setting, but also, and more broadly, be conversant about and 
experienced in what constitutes “good process.”  Bringing this expertise 
to a conversation is a significant contribution and no mediator should 
become defensive if charged by others as being “all about process.” 
But the distinction between process and substantive expertise 
addresses two different matters, one relating to mediator qualifications 
and the other to the mediator’s role.  The process–substance distinction, 
initially, highlights the possibility that a person might be thoroughly 
knowledgeable about the subject matter in dispute—knowing how 
movie scripts are developed and written can help a mediator appreciate 
a controversy between competing authors over movie credits for the 
screenplay—but inexperienced or unskilled at conducting an 
informative, constructive conversation.  Because knowing how to 
include participants, facilitate information exchanges, probe for 
priorities, and generate ideas are, in important ways, “process skills,” 
 
can affect the substance of a dispute). 
14. Susskind suggests this distinction when concluding that environmental mediators, 
when fulfilling the responsibilities he sets forth,  
 
were willing to inject themselves into the substance of the disputes.  They were not 
content merely to facilitate and encourage discussion among the parties.  In that 
regard, they were activitists. . . .  They worked behind the scenes, between meetings 
and during meetings, to find elements of agreement that could be treated 
separately, items that could be taded, issues that could be packaged, and ways in 
which the momentum of the negotiations could be used to pressure holdouts.   
Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 
1, 39–40 (1981).  Riskin’s account of the facilitative and evaluative mediator can be viewed as 
a different attempt to account for the same phenomenon.  See Riskin, supra note 4, at 24–35 
& fig.3. 
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not having them presumptively disqualifies someone from mediating. 
The second matter that the distinction crystallizes relates to the role 
of the mediator.  If one presumes that the mediation process should be 
structured to facilitate proposals acceptable to the parties, the potential 
downside of having a mediator who is a “substantive” expert is that she 
will cajole, direct, or coerce the parties into accepting those resolutions 
that the mediator believes (perhaps accurately, given her expertise) are 
the right, best, or fair thing to do; that, of course, potentially undermines 
party autonomy. 
While I believe that the process–knowledge distinction is 
conceptually plausible, I find it importantly misleading and, hence, 
dangerous.  To appreciate the danger, let us reconsider the perspective 
of a party to mediation.  What contribution does the mediator make to 
the conversation if she does not have knowledge about any (or indeed, 
several) of the matters in or dynamics of dispute?  In my judgment, the 
contribution might not only be minimal—it might be affirmatively 
harmful.  How is that possible? 
First, I believe such process intervention would be only minimally 
effective.  If the mediator does not possess some knowledge about a 
particular area relevant to the controversy, then she is not able to ask 
questions that might be helpful15 or to probe the plausibility or 
desirability of particular party claims.16  Participating in such a process 
could be a considerable waste of a party’s time and resources.  There are 
ways, of course, for the mediator to plug this knowledge gap—one ready 
strategy is to create a mediator team in which at least one member 
possesses relevant substantive knowledge about significant aspects of 
the dispute.  But to make this move embraces the notion that knowledge 
as well as process is required. 
 
15. Thereby failing to discharge the mediator’s goal of improving participant 
understanding of the challenge.  See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS 
pmbl. (2003) (describing mediation as a process that “serves various purposes, including 
providing the opportunity for parties to define and clarify issues” and “understand different 
perspectives”). 
16. Thereby failing to discharge the mediator’s task of being an agent of reality.  I realize 
that these tasks are not described as central elements of the mediator’s job in the 
transformative model of mediation, in the sense that it is the mediator’s task to advance these 
inquiries when not prompted or endorsed by party request.  See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH 
& JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT 
THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 116–18 (1994).  But if one presumes that all 
parties have invited such intervention, then having—or not having—relevant substantive 
knowledge about aspects of the controversy becomes applicable. 
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Second, acting on the proposed distinction—and securing a mediator 
with only process skills—jeopardizes justice outcomes.  I believe the 
process–knowledge distinction cuts two ways: the danger of a mediator 
possessing substantive knowledge is that she might try to impose her 
beliefs about a desirable outcome on unwilling parties; but equally, the 
danger of having only a process expert is that parties might generate 
outcomes that are notably uninformed or unfair. 
How do we sort this out?  The answer is not to jettison the concept 
of mediator neutrality.  Rather, we should embrace the idea that an 
effective mediator is one who must possess both process and substantive 
knowledge17 and then explore how that combination can be consistently 
marshaled to discharge the mediator’s job. 
B.  Passive–Active Mediator 
What would it mean for someone to be a passive mediator?  I find it 
easier to understand that concept by analyzing its contrast, the activist 
mediator. 
The “activist mediator,” a term often used to describe Susskind’s 
account of the environmental mediator,18 characterizes mediator 
conduct that often includes: (1) “pressing a party” to justify the 
persuasiveness of its particular claim or the plausibility of its proposal; 
(2) persistently or aggressively prodding the parties to engage in 
brainstorming to generate possible settlement terms; (3) suggesting 
ideas to some or all parties for possible resolution; and (4) controlling 
the discussion process—deciding, for example, whether a proposal 
 
17. To claim that a mediator should possess both process and substantive knowledge 
does not mean, of course, that the “substantive knowledge” that a mediator possesses 
matches the full range of knowledge needs that might arise in a particular dispute.  For 
instance, if someone were to mediate an environmental dispute involving the closing of a 
nuclear plant, she might possess broad-based knowledge about the political process and 
dynamics for regulating such environmental matters, but she might possess very little 
knowledge about the science of nuclear waste disposal.  Again, the plausible “fix” for this is 
to join a person to the mediation team—or to gain the party’s endorsement of providing a 
neutral expert for themselves or the mediator—in order to facilitate joint understanding, 
discussion, and problem solving.  See generally Lela P. Love & Joseph B. Stulberg, Practice 
Guidelines for Co-Mediation: Making Certain that “Two Heads Are Better Than One,” 13 
MEDIATION Q. 179 (1996). 
18. Susskind’s actual term is “mediator with clout.”  Susskind, supra note 14, at 35; see 
also id. at 42 (asserting that “[e]ffective environmental mediation may require . . . some 
[mediators] with political clout”).  I later termed this example a “special case of the activist 
mediator.”  Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor 
Susskind, 6 VT. L. REV. 85, 109 (1981). 
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developed in an individual caucus should be transmitted in a 
reconvened joint session or in a separate caucus. 
Many writers have identified such mediator behavior and endorsed 
its use.  For the most part, Riskin’s evaluative mediator is an activist,19 
Alfini’s “trashers,” “hashers,” and “bashers” are activists,20 and Stulberg 
and Love’s BADGER mediator fits this description as well.21  If the 
above account of the activist mediator is accurate, then the most vivid 
“non-activist” mediator is, presumptively, someone who exhibits some 
version of Riskin’s “facilitative” mediator22 and, most prominently, 
includes a transformative mediator.23  But this “sorting” process is 
mischievous, for it masks the danger of the “passivist–activist” 
distinction as it relates to justice considerations. 
The “facilitative” mediator is often characterized as the mediator 
who only asks questions.24  She only “helps,” and never “urges” or 
“pushes.”25  That mediator approach, understandably, can be labeled 
“passive.”  It is easy to understand that the mediator who embraces the 
process–substantive distinction and who then asserts that she is a 
“process-only” expert and mediates with a facilitative approach could 
quickly, and accurately, be labeled a “passive” mediator.  That mediator 
would resist any party request to provide information—“my role is to 
help all of you talk this through in a cordial manner, not to provide 
information or make suggestions”—and would refuse to probe or 
challenge the plausibility or acceptability of particular proposals—“my 
job is not to tell any of you what to do, it is to create a comfortable 
conversational climate in which you can discuss any matter that you 
wish.” 
 
19. Riskin, supra note 4, at 28. 
20. James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of “Good 
Mediation”?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 66–73 (1991). 
21. STULBERG & LOVE, supra note 4, at 45–46. 
22. Riskin, supra note 4, at 28–29, 32–34. 
23. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 16, at 116.  I think it is important, however, to qualify 
this account of transformative mediation.  I believe a transformative mediator is “activist” in 
multiple, significant ways, many of which I believe are congruent with other approaches to 
mediation.  But if I understand the transformative approach accurately, then clearly the 
transformative mediator is not an activist in the ways described above, unless it is preceded by 
the mediator asking parties a question such as: “Do you think it would be helpful to each of 
you if I shared with you some approaches to resolving such matters that I have seen work for 
persons in other settings?”  But perhaps even that question is too direct. 
24. See, e.g., Riskin, supra note 4, at 28. 
25. See id. at 35 fig.3. 
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Many of us have observed such passive mediators.  In my judgment, 
there is nothing to recommend that approach.  It often generates party 
frustration and exasperation.  But that harsh critique must not be 
misunderstood. 
I certainly believe that a mediator can—and, frankly, must—be 
“facilitative.”  It is the only approach to mediating consistent with 
promoting party dignity, respect, and autonomous decision-making.  I 
support the notion that evaluative mediation, as it is reportedly 
practiced, is inconsistent with a robust conception of the mediation 
process.26 
But the danger of these two dichotomies is this: A mediator, when 
doing her job, must be (1) knowledgeable about both process and at 
least some aspects of the substance; (2) facilitative; and (3) activist.27  
How is it possible to blend these necessary elements and still be neutral 
with regard to outcomes?  We must revisit the process–substance 
distinction. 
V.  PROCESS–SUBSTANCE AND THEORIES OF JUSTICE 
As both Lawrence Susskind and Bernard Mayer properly note, a 
mediator must care deeply about process matters.  Those elements 
include answering such questions as: Who should participate?  Who can 
be present and who must participate?  Where and when will the 
meetings occur?  What guidelines govern the process of developing or 
sharing information?  What happens if one party displays a significant 
inability to participate adequately in the process? 
Why are these matters important?  They are important because we 
care that the mediation process comports with considerations of justice.  
At least in the United States, we seem able to generate consensus 
regarding the basic elements that constitute a due process 
 
26. See Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, “Evaluative” Mediation Is an Oxymoron, 
14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 31, 31–32 (1996).  I find unpersuasive—and, often, 
self-serving—defenses for the evaluative mediator approach, particularly when that defense is 
lodged in the claim that it is the approach that the parties want.  For thoughtful attempts to 
defend evaluative mediation, see Marjorie Corman Aaron, Evaluation in Mediation, in 
MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR LAWYERS AND MEDIATORS 
267, 268 (Dwight Golann ed., 1996); John Bickerman, Evaluative Mediator Responds, 14 
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 70 (1996); and James H. Stark, The Ethics of 
Mediation Evaluation: Some Troublesome Questions and Tentative Proposals, from an 
Evaluative Lawyer Mediator, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 769, 770, 775–79, 798 (1997). 
27. See Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator Orientations: Piercing 
the “Grid” Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 996–97 (1997). 
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conversation.28  But what conception of justice is advanced by “good 
process”?  Here it is helpful to return to Rawls’ distinction noted 
above.29 
Rawls describes three types of procedural justice programs: (1) 
perfect procedural justice; (2) imperfect procedural justice; and (3) pure 
procedural justice.30 
What distinguishes perfect and imperfect procedural justice from 
pure procedural justice is that the standards for determining a fair or 
desired outcome in the first two are independent of the process itself.31  
By contrast, in pure procedural justice, the standard for determining a 
fair or desired outcome is embedded within the process itself.32  How are 
these distinctions relevant to real problems? 
For many social activities, we can successfully create a process that 
systematically advances or secures our independently established and 
justified goal.  A grievance procedure negotiated between union and 
management representatives that stipulates binding arbitration as its last 
step is a party-designed process that perfectly promotes the consistent 
interpretation and application of the substantive terms of the parties’ 
collective bargaining agreement.   
A process of imperfect procedural justice also promotes an 
independently justified goal.  But it has the following feature: it 
explicitly recognizes that the process may have values that conflict with 
always securing the stated goal, but for independent reasons, they 
should be recognized and operate to trump that goal.  For example, 
college sports fans endorse the goal of being able to identify one college 
football team each year that is the best in the land—hence, deserving of 
a number-one ranking.  But the process used to secure that outcome—
 
28. When developing the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, Standard VI.A, 
Professor Michael Moffitt forcefully contended at the April 2004 public meeting that was 
discussing the Model Standards that the Joint Committee should use the phrase “procedural 
fairness” rather than “fairness” when delineating the ethical duties of a mediator when 
conducting a quality mediation process.  Many in that audience strongly endorsed his 
comment.  The adopted version (September 2005) contains that language.  See MODEL 
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS standard VI.A (2005).  For a more complete 
description of Moffitt’s opinions, see Michael L. Moffitt, The Wrong Model, Again: Why the 
Devil Is Not in the Details of the New Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, DISP. RES. 
MAG., Spring 2006, at 32. 
29. RAWLS, supra note 8, at 85–86. 
30. Id.  
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 86. 
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the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) process—accommodates such 
other values as league identity and bowl traditions that can operate to 
trump creating a championship game among the country’s two best 
teams. 
If a mediation advocate were to promote mediation’s use because it 
generated outcomes that were close to those reached in non-mediated 
settings (presumptively, court settings) and because mediations were 
conducted more efficiently, with less financial and emotional cost to the 
parties, and generated outcomes that gained high compliance, then that 
advocate views mediation as an instance of perfect procedural justice.  
Why?  Because the cited goals—to generate outcomes close to those 
reached in a court process efficiently and with less burden on the 
parties—are criteria for establishing the “justice” of the process and are 
developed and justified independent of the process itself.  Mayer 
appears to endorse this approach.33  A mediation proponent could also 
endorse mediation as an instance of imperfect procedural justice by 
insisting that such values as party autonomy, improving party 
relationships, or displaying respect for one’s bargaining counterpart 
might sometimes operate to result in mediated settlement terms that 
were less generous than court-imposed outcomes.  
By contrast, Susskind importantly and emphatically states, “good 
process almost always yields a good outcome.”34  That approach appears 
to embrace Rawls’ sense of mediation being an instance of pure 
procedural justice.35  Susskind urges that a mediator must pay attention 
to the following process details before she endorses or signs off on the 
process: Are the appropriate parties included in the conversation?  Does 
each party have the capacity or skill to capably articulate their interests 
and examine their options?  Are procedures or understandings in place 
for handling the possibility that the proposed negotiated outcome will 
harm a non-participant?  What will happen if the proposed outcomes 
overlook the possibility of alternative arrangements that could notably 
 
33. Panel Discussion, Core Values of Dispute Resolution: Is Neutrality Necessary?, 95 
MARQ. L. REV. 805, 819 (indicating that outcomes in mediation—at least in the divorce 
area—do not differ notably from those secured through non-mediated outcomes).  However, 
Mayer’s subsequent comments regarding the central need for “constructive engagement” 
could be read to support an alternative interpretation.  Id. at 819.  I explore that below.  See 
infra pp. 851–54. 
34. Panel Discussion, supra note 33, at 819–20.  
35. See RAWLS, supra note 8, at 88 (describing how, under pure procedural justice, 
“allotment of [benefits] takes place in accordance with the public system of rules”). 
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enhance each party’s interests and goals?36  For Susskind, if all these 
matters are successfully addressed, then it appears that we have created 
a process whose fair outcomes are contained in the process itself.  That, 
in fact, is the approach I enthusiastically endorse.37  But Susskind 
appears to shy away from that conclusion, so we continue to differ in 
two ways. 
First, when Susskind raised these considerations in his early 
celebrated piece,38 the inference many drew—particularly when he 
discussed and endorsed the notion of the mediator with clout39—was 
that Susskind concluded it was the mediator’s duty to protect the 
unrepresented interests and insure Pareto-optimal outcomes.40  If the 
negotiating parties did not agree to the presence of a representative in 
the negotiations to protect the interests of an “unborn generation” nor 
were committed to adopting Pareto-maximum outcomes, then it was the 
mediator’s ethical duty—he was accountable for—to protect those 
unrepresented interests or secure Pareto-optimality.  But in my 
judgment, those considerations—protecting future generations or 
Pareto optimality—are more accurately described as independent 
standards that define a “fair” or “just” outcome.  If those goals must be 
secured by the conduct of parties in the mediated discussions, then 
mediation in its strongest formulation would be an example of perfect, 
not pure, procedural justice. 
Second, Susskind’s more recent account, beginning with his 
statement that “good process almost always yields a good outcome,”41 
appears to differ from his earlier approach.  Susskind thoughtfully 
advances the following claim: “[W]e need to be prepared to say what we 
think a good outcome is.”42  And, to him, a “good outcome” has the 
following features: (1) it is viewed as fair by the parties; (2) the process 
was efficient; (3) the outcome or outcomes are stable; and (4) the 
 
36. See Panel Discussion, supra note 33, at 809, 816–17.  This list is not meant to be 
exhaustive.  While Susskind at first instance shies away from insisting that all these matters be 
actually adopted and in place before proceeding (“I only ask questions about these matters”), 
for reasons discussed below, I do not think that goes far enough. 
37. I believe Mayer does as well.  See his discussion of “constructive engagement.”  Id. 
at 819. 
38. See Susskind, supra note 14. 
39. Id. at 30–37. 
40. Id. at 17.  To achieve a Pareto-optimal outcome, a “neutral observer must be 
convinced that joint net gains have been maximized.”  Id. 
41. Panel Discussion, supra note 33, at 816. 
42. Id. at 816–17. 
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outcome or outcomes are wise.43 
I believe the first three elements are correct.  But the fourth 
feature—the outcome must be “wise”—brings through the back door an 
external standard for assessing what is “fair” or “right”—and thereby 
transforms the mediation framework from that of pure procedural 
justice to one of either perfect or imperfect procedural justice.  More 
importantly, if it is the mediator’s duty (or that for which he can be held 
accountable) to ensure a ‘wise’ outcome, then a mediator must jettison 
her commitment to the neutrality of outcomes, for her job is to secure 
wisdom.  For reasons I argued previously, I do not find this vision of an 
impartial, but non-neutral, mediator consistent with the distinctively 
democratic values of the mediation process.  Where does that leave us? 
VI.  A JUSTICE FRAMEWORK FOR MEDIATION 
Each of us in this field is—properly—concerned about endorsing, 
promoting, and supporting a dispute resolution process whose outcomes 
flaunt basic standards of fair treatment, considerations of equality and 
respect, and the exercise of individual freedom.44 
We can readily envision hypotheticals that trigger our sense of 
injustice: the soon-to-be ex-spouse who agrees to financial settlement 
terms less generous than what the law mandates or the tenant who 
accepts the landlord’s reimbursement of the contested security deposit 
ignorant that she was legally entitled to treble damages.  Why should we 
promote “acceptability” or “party autonomy” in mediation if its 
outcomes significantly deviate from these community norms?45 
I want to celebrate acceptability for two fundamental reasons: First, 
 
43. Id. 
44. One can criticize this claim as being myopically “Western”—and individualistic at 
that—in one’s orientation to human values.  That charge, while clearly important, requires an 
extended response, which I think perfectly possible.  All I need or want to highlight by 
making this comment is that at least for mediation advocates practicing in the United States, 
if we observed that mediation was being used to help parties forge agreements that 
systematically denied all citizens access to various employment opportunities, resulting in 
“mutually acceptable plans” that sustained public school systems that were both racially 
segregated and allocated significantly disproportionate public economic resources to those of 
only one race, then we would all be concerned that the “mediation process” was producing 
outcomes that were not simply “illegal” under current law but also “unfair” or “unjust.”  And 
those claims, which I believe are warranted, would be based on our considered appeals to 
political liberty and equal treatment. 
45. See ELLEN WALDMAN, MEDIATION ETHICS: CASES AND COMMENTARIES 26 
(2011) (stating that “legal norms can be useful in delineating the minimal set of obligations 
owed the less powerful by the more powerful”). 
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the values of mediation support and require persons to treat one 
another with dignity and respect.46  Second, I believe that a well-
designed mediation process generates “just” results more consistently 
and compellingly than do other dispute-resolution procedures.  While 
that may appear to be an audacious claim, I believe it is persuasive.  But 
central to its persuasiveness is that a mediator must be neutral with 
respect to outcome—without it, the process indeed can be dangerous. 
I have argued elsewhere that six features must be part of a 
mediation process in order for us (à la Susskind and Mayer) to assert 
that it is a “good” process.47  More strongly, I claim that if these six 
features are present, then the mediation should be considered an 
example of pure procedural justice and that any outcomes generated by 
its participants will be just.48  In short, “party acceptability” is laudable 
as a matter of justice.49 
I set out below a brief description of those standards and a short 
account of their significance. 
(1) Voluntariness.  Each mediation participant must have the 
capacity to engage in autonomous decision-making, displaying an ability 
to choose among two or more possible actions.  Persons who lack 
mental capacity to make rational decisions cannot genuinely participate 
in a dispute resolution process that predicates decision-making on party 
autonomy.50 
(2) Inalienability of interests.  The mediation process must be such 
that no person can irrevocably relinquish her ability to enjoy one of her 
fundamental freedoms throughout the course of a normal life.  A person 
who agrees to be another’s servant for life in exchange for sustained 
food and shelter should, in a dispute resolution process, be able to 
 
46. This claim is similar to what transformative mediators posit as one of their two main 
goals: “recognition.”  See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH AND JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE 
PROMISE OF MEDIATION 77 (2004) (explaining that the hallmark of a recognition shift is 
“letting go—however briefly or partially—of one’s focus on self and becoming interested in 
the perspective of the other party as such, concerned about the situation of the other as a 
fellow human being, not as an instrument for fulfilling one’s own needs”)  But my argument 
for supporting the notion that the mediation process requires parties to accord dignity and 
respect to one another is conceptually different.  See Joseph B. Stulberg, Mediation and 
Justice: What Standards Govern?, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 213, 234–38 (2005). 
47. Stulberg, supra note 46, at 227–28. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 227–29. 
50. Id. at 228–30. 
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escape that contractual duty of enslavement.51 
(3) Publicity of outcomes.  In principle, outcomes must be capable of 
being made public so that the mediation process does not become a 
vehicle to sustain free-riders.52  Settlement terms (deals such as paying 
people off the books) that are predicated on everyone else complying 
with rules but not the mediation parties—i.e., freeloaders—should not 
be possible as a matter of normal practice.53 
(4) Dignity and respect.  In principle, the process must be structured 
so that persons affected by the outcome can participate in it and 
everyone can discuss matters that are important to them.  This insures 
that the conversation is conducted in a manner that promotes party 
dignity and respect.  Stated differently, if the rules of the mediation 
process arbitrarily restrict who can participate or what can be discussed, 
then there is a significant risk that the discussion is skewed so that 
matters of fundamental importance and dignity to one party are not 
addressed.54 
(5) Informed decision-making.  While no dispute resolution process 
can require fully informed decision-making, the process must provide 
some avenue for persons to have adequate information on which to 
make their decisions.55 
(6) Toleration of conflicting fundamental values.  The mediation 
process has no purpose if it cannot serve as a forum for disputants who 
hold profoundly different values to meet and explore resolving and 
negotiating issues between them.56 
The stereotype often ascribed to “do-gooder” mediators is that 
mediators require everyone to be nice and to like one another.  
 
51. Id. at 230–33. 
52. This claim is consistent with the conventional wisdom—and law in many areas—that 
mediated conversations and outcomes are confidential.  The goal of this standard is to 
prevent parties from reaching agreements that the parties know to be unlawful and that will 
be effective only because they will keep matters secret.  I do not believe that we would want 
to endorse a public system for using mediation to resolve disputes if we thought that this 
could occur on a widespread basis.  Of course, private organizations, in considering the use of 
mediation to resolve intra-organizational matters, might have a different viewpoint on this 
matter. 
53. Id. at 233–34. 
54. Id. at 234–38.  This feature does not solve the practical challenge that the power 
differential between the parties might lead one party to refuse to discuss what the other party 
wants to examine.  That is an important challenge—but not a justice one. 
55. Id. at 238–40. 
56. Id. at 240–41. 
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Nonsense.  If the mediation process is structured so that parties with 
longstanding antagonisms—perhaps grounded in religious, racial, 
economic, or cultural differences—cannot meet to discuss targeted 
challenges unless one or more of the parties change their perspective, 
then that process fails on justice considerations.  That is not to approve 
or condone all values.  Rather, it helps highlight what mediated 
discussions can address.  At least some of the major participants in the 
Occupy Wall Street demonstration57 presumptively do not share some of 
the values of New York City’s elected political leadership.  That does 
not mean one or the other party must change their viewpoint before 
engaging in mediated dialogue.  Or to cite another instance, the 
residents of the Poweltown neighborhood in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 
did not have to accept the philosophical claims of the members of 
MOVE—nor MOVE members accept the beliefs of the residents who 
were viewed as part of “the system”—in order for all of them to 
participate meaningfully in a mediation process designed to address 
neighborhood health and safety issues.58 
I believe that if a mediation process is structured to incorporate each 
of these dimensions, then the process is fair and the outcomes that the 
parties develop and embrace will themselves be fair.  But that will be 
true only if the mediator is, in principle and in conduct, neutral with 
regard to outcome. 
VII.  PROGRAM DESIGN AND MEDIATOR NEUTRALITY 
Susskind and Mayer thoughtfully focus on what Mayer describes as 
matters that are “all about design.”59  In fact, Mayer claims that 
mediators can, “help design [in advance a] structure of the interaction.”60  
Susskind simply posits that a person retained by some parties to assist 
them with a controversy could comfortably label herself a mediator—
but then she should proceed with her engagement in a way that 
discharges her duties noted above.  I do not believe that any substantive 
 
57. Occupy Wall Street (OWS) is a protest movement that began September 17, 2011, in 
Zuccotti Park, located in New York City’s Wall Street financial district.  The protest 
movement decries corporate influence in government and wealth inequality.  See About, 
OCCUPYWALLSTREET, http://occupywallst.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2012).  
58. For a breathtaking account of this significant social challenge, see HIZKIAS ASSEFA 
& PAUL WAHRHAFTIG, EXTREMIST GROUPS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE MOVE 
CRISIS IN PHILADELPHIA (1988). 
59. Panel Discussion, supra note 33, at 814–15. 
60. Id. at 815. 
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difference rides on this terminological point.  What is crucial, however, 
and I believe applicable to both accounts, is raised by the question, what 
should the dispute designer or mediator do if the parties insist on 
proceeding in a way that the designer or mediator believes undesirable?  
That is, what should the intervener do if, in her mind, she does not 
believe there is a good process? 
Examples abound.  Susskind has observed that the framework for 
resolving labor relations matters differ importantly across cultures.61  In 
Paris, France, when transportation workers declare a strike of the Metro 
system, the intervener might quickly ask leaders of the workers’ groups 
and government agencies whether representatives from the local 
chamber of commerce or the “Metro riders” organization should also be 
included in the talks.62  Much like an environmental dispute, the 
rationale for expanded participation is obvious and compelling: 
businesspersons and Metro-riders (or their representatives) are 
stakeholders affected by the outcome of the negotiations.  As a 
pragmatic matter, their participation might possibly be constructive to 
clarifying and resolving the issues, or at least make the implementation 
of negotiated outcomes less contentious.  As a matter of democratic 
principle, they are entitled to have a voice. 
Contrast that approach with the private-sector labor relations’ 
framework operating in the United States.63  The National Basketball 
Association (NBA) and the NBA Players Association engaged in a 
lockout that eliminated its traditional pre-season schedule and almost 
two months of its regular season.64  Local businesses tied to the NBA 
suffered significant economic losses.65  Local governments lost tax 
 
61. Lawrence Susskind, What Gets Lost in Translation, NEGOTIATION: DECISION-
MAKING AND COMM. STRATEGIES THAT DELIVER RESULTS (Harv. Univ., Cambridge, 
MA), Sept. 1, 2004, at 1, 4–5 (recommending that a mediator, when conducting cross-culture 
mediations, should research the counterpart’s background and experience, enlist cultural 
advisors, and pay particularly close attention to unfolding negotiation dynamics). 
62. For an article discussing a recent strike in Paris, see Nicola Clark, France: Workers 
Vote to Extend Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2010, at A21. 
63. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006). 
64. The NBA lockout began at midnight on July 1, 2011.  Howard Beck, Stalemate in 
Labor Talks Forces N.B.A. to Shut Down, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2011, at B9.  On November 26, 
2011, owners and players reached a tentative agreement to end the lockout, which included 
starting the season on December 25, 2011.  Howard Beck, N.B.A. Reaches Tentative Deal to 
Save Season, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2011, at A1.  The agreement was ratified on December 8, 
2011.  Ken Belson, N.B.A. Owners and Players Make Labor Agreement Official, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 9, 2011, at B18. 
65. See, e.g., Ken Belson, In Portland, Where Blazers Reign, Lockout Leaves Void, N.Y. 
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revenue.66  Fans were disappointed.  Potential draftees to the league 
were in limbo about career opportunities.67  If a mediator from the 
Federal Mediation & Conciliation Service (FMCS) (or a private 
mediator hired by the parties) suggested to the representatives of the 
club owners and ballplayers that their collective bargaining sessions 
expand to include representatives from these stakeholders, I believe 
their response would have been straightforward and vociferous: “No!”  
Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and its amendments, 
bargaining is restricted to statutorily designated representatives68—in 
this instance, the employer and the representative of the selected 
employee group.  That is whom the FMCS mediator, by statute, works 
with.  Would Mayer—or any other conscientious mediator—agree or 
continue to serve if he thought that such a process did not provide for 
“constructive engagement”?69 
This is a crucial ethical question for a mediator that I believe arises 
rather routinely in practice.  It is the type of question that Mayer 
correctly raises in his discussion of process design.70  Should there be a 
court-annexed mediation program for resolving matters relating to a 
marital dissolution when, under the court’s program, the mediator is 
allowed only forty-five minutes for the mediation?  If that is what the 
court wants to adopt, should Mayer’s planner jettison the process?  
Should individual mediators refuse to participate in it? 
How should we respond to this type of process-design challenge?  I 
believe that different persons might, within a reasonable range, make 
different judgments about whether she should proceed.  We readily 
understand—and have accepted—how a mediator routinely embraces 
the labor-relations framework operative in the United States (whether 
in the private or public sector), thereby excluding all non-statutorily 
 
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2011, at SP5 [hereinafter Belson, Portland]; Tom Spousta, Oklahoma Wallets 
and Pride Were Hurt, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2011, at SP4 (reporting that “[t]he Oklahoma City 
chamber of commerce estimated that each of the eight Thunder home dates lost with a 
shortened 66-game season would cost $1.3 million”). 
66. See, e.g., Belson, Portland, supra note 65. 
67. See, e.g., NBA Players File Antitrust Lawuits Against League, Games Canceled 
Through Dec. 15, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 15, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-11-
15/news/chi-nba-union-antitrust-complaint-to-be-filed-tuesday-night-20111115_1_nba-lockout 
-nba-players-antitrust-lawsuits (reporting that Derrick Williams, the second overall draft pick 
of the 2011 NBA draft, had yet to sign a contract because of the lockout). 
68. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). 
69. Panel Discussion, supra note 33, at 820. 
70. Id. at 814–15. 
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designated stakeholders from participating in collective bargaining 
sessions.  And we can surely appreciate how other individuals might 
forcefully criticize that design feature by claiming that it disenfranchises 
important stakeholders, and, on that basis—on a justice basis—refuse to 
serve.71 
But what is crucial to note is that if an individual mediator decides to 
participate, she must still remain neutral with respect to outcome.  That 
is, the design process “flaw” is a flaw of injustice—but even in the 
flawed system, a neutral mediator can promote mediation’s values of 
autonomy and respect, at least with regard to those persons 
participating in it.  However, if she discards her neutrality commitment, 
then she exacerbates the injustice.   
How is that so? 
VIII.  MEDIATOR NEUTRALITY: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS? 
A mediator must be neutral with respect to negotiated outcomes but 
not neutral with respect to process.72  That insight, properly understood, 
remains valid.73  We can see why this is the case if we analyze Mayer’s 
distinction between designing a process and conducting a mediation 
within the designed process.74 
A.  “Mediating” (or Consulting) About Process 
The negotiating parties invite you to help them resolve their 
 
71. “No taxation without representation” is certainly a historical rallying cry for persons 
in the United States.  See generally Grant Dorfman, Essay, The Founders’ Legal Case: “No 
Taxation Without Representation” Versus Taxation No Tyranny, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1377 
(2008) (providing a historical discussion on the importance of the phrase). 
72. See Stulberg, supra note 18, at 96 (asserting that a major characteristic of a mediator 
is that they “must be neutral with regard to outcome”). 
73. The challenge arises when the parties agree to create a process that the mediator 
finds undesirable.  Some argue that the mediator must be flexible and honor party self-
determination; others cite, for instance, the Model Standards of Conduct, particularly 
Standard VI.  See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS standard VI (2005) 
(requiring that a mediator only conduct a mediation “in a manner that promotes . . . 
procedural fairness”). 
74. See Panel Discussion, supra note 33, at 813.  Mayer noted that “there is room for a 
lot of variation in how people view their role and responsibility”; consequently, when 
establishing the process, the mediator will rarely be neutral.  Id. at 812–13.  In contrast, while 
conducting mediation, the mediator must conduct the meeting from a “neutral stance—in 
other words, [the mediator] can insure that participants are provided an effective voice and 
that important issues are not avoided without intentionally trying to benefit one side at the 
expense of the other.”  Id. at 813. 
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controversy.  Presume the conflict involves wolves roaming onto 
agricultural land, destroying crops.  Property owners, in defending their 
property, start shooting the animals.  Various groups, including 
environmental groups concerned about protecting endangered species 
as well as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) 
representatives who are alarmed about such animal treatment, publicly 
press their viewpoints.  The local mayor and the state’s governor are 
widely quoted as deploring the attack on animals but express sympathy 
for the farmers’ needs.  The appropriate local, state, and federal 
government agency personnel are stymied about how to proceed.  They 
contact you—a mediator or consultant—and ask you to help.  They 
propose the following process: (a) the intervener should convene 
representatives from each of the relevant government agencies at the 
federal, state, and local levels to discuss appropriate policy guidelines 
and implementing programs; (b) no other stakeholders should be 
included in the discussions, since their concerns and aspirations are 
already represented among the government personnel; and (c) the 
federal government will pay the entire mediator fee. 
How would you respond?  Put bluntly, to challenge my thesis, should 
a mediator be neutral with regard to these matters?  My answer: Of 
course not. 
I would make the decision about going forward by analyzing two 
separate questions, one regarding the proposed participants and the 
other regarding the payment of mediator fees. 
1. Proposed Participants.   
I would press each group regarding their claim that they “represent” 
the interests of the non-participating stakeholders, wanting to learn 
more about how those concerns and interests would and could be 
addressed.  It may be that, in the end, the nongovernmental 
stakeholders do not participate in the negotiating sessions, and the 
participating governmental personnel develop viable ways to elicit and 
benefit from their engagement, such as conducting public bargaining 
sessions,75 conducting regular press conferences, or creating a website 
 
75. This approach was systematically used in the Kettering Foundation’s Negotiated 
Investment Strategy involving federal, state, and local governments during the late-1970s and 
1980s.  For a discussion of the Negotiated Investment Strategy, see Lawrence Susskind & 
Connie Ozawa, Mediated Negotiation in the Public Sector: The Planner as Mediator, 4 J. 
PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 5, 6 (1984). 
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presence to capture public comments. 
But let us presume that all the government representatives refuse to 
open the conversations to others.  They simply say, “We want you to 
mediate the conversations in the way that we have proposed.  If you do 
not wish to do it, we will find someone else.” 
What should one do?  In my judgment, the mediator or consultant 
must decide whether proceeding as proposed operates to exclude other 
significant stakeholders from having a meaningful voice in a matter that 
might affect them in some notable, perhaps significant way—and, if it 
does, whether that raises a due process value that should trump one’s 
proceeding with the discussion.  Different persons will make different 
judgments, but if my assessment were that my participation would 
systematically promote coalition building that forecloses other 
meaningful opportunities for other affected persons to have voice at 
some point in the process, then I would not proceed. 
What is crucial to note in this analysis is that the target of the 
mediator–consultant’s concern is not the substantive outcome of the 
controversy.  Rather, it is the integrity of the mediation process as 
constituting a fair, just procedure.  In my analysis, I would have 
concluded that the proposed approach fails to honor the requisite 
elements of dignity and respect.  What the parties are proposing might 
be a process that develops a political resolution to the challenge but it is 
not a justice process. 
Suppose, though, that a mediator believed that the proposed 
approach was acceptable.  She must still address the question of whether 
having one party to the mediation pay the entire mediator fee comports 
with “good process.” 
2. Payment of Mediator Fee.   
The Model Standards provide some, though not conclusive, guidance 
for answering this question.  Standard VIII.B.2 provides, “While a 
mediator may accept unequal fee payments from the parties, a mediator 
should not allow such a fee arrangement to adversely impact the 
mediator’s ability to conduct a mediation in an impartial manner.”76  The 
concern is clear: if one party pays the mediator’s fee, that mediator may 
manipulate the process to promote an outcome sought by that payor—
and that would undermine process integrity.  Again, the concern is a 
 
76. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS standard VIII.B.2 (2005). 
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justice concern: not acting impartially undermines the dignity and 
respect that the mediator or consultant accords relevant stakeholders, 
and being paid by only one stakeholder might motivate the intervener to 
press for one particular outcome favored by that group—so neutrality is 
also jeopardized.  A mediator should not be hesitant—or neutral—when 
rejecting such proposed process guidelines. 
B.  Mediating Within a Process 
I asserted above that if a mediator decides to participate in a process 
that is acknowledged to be flawed from a justice perspective, she must 
still remain neutral with respect to outcome.  If the mediator of a child-
custody dispute is allotted only forty-five minutes to conduct the 
conversation, she still has no warrant for guiding, directing, or pushing 
the parties to adopt a particular outcome.  Similarly, if the mediator of 
the environmental controversy noted above was concerned that not all 
stakeholders were adequately represented, it is not her role to shape the 
negotiated conversation to increase the likelihood that only one set of 
outcomes would be considered.  Why?   
We object to such mediator conduct on the grounds that it is not the 
mediator’s job to determine—and then effectively mandate—the “best” 
outcome for the parties.  A mediator behaving in that manner is not, 
presumptively, what the parties wanted, even in a process that might 
otherwise be skewed.  If the parties wanted a decision-maker, they could 
create a process to deliver it.  But what is central to mediation—I 
believe its driving value—is that it systematically supports individuals or 
groups to exercise their freedom and to take responsibility for making 
decisions regarding how they choose to move forward.  It requires 
engaged participation that leads to outcomes for which each negotiator 
is accountable.  To promote those central elements, the mediator must 
remain neutral.77 
Which brings us full circle. 
 
77. One standard defense of this mediator conduct—even if the mediator community 
were generally appalled at it—is, “Well, all the mediator is doing is suggesting what the 
parties ought to do—perhaps in very strong language.  But the parties are always free to 
reject his advice; they can always—and only—agree on what they find acceptable.  If they 
don’t want it, fine, but proposing it might get them to consider another option that works for 
them.”  The problem with this retort, of course, is that it defends almost any conduct—with 
the claim that parties can always say no. 
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IX.  CONCLUSION 
We promote mediation’s use because we view it as a fundamental, 
central procedure for resolving controversies in a democratic society.  
We extol it as a process that requires meaningful citizen participation.  It 
requires each participant to take responsibility both for enhancing one 
another’s understanding of the situation and for developing acceptable 
outcomes.  It not only celebrates but also requires each person—not 
someone else—to make a decision for herself as to how the matter 
should be resolved. 
That is why we cherish mediation.  But if the mediator wants to 
convert that process into a conversation in which people listen to—and 
abide by—what the intervener promotes, we have lost.  A mediator 
must be neutral because justice demands it. 
